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COMPUTER SYSTEMS FRAUD - COMPUTER SYSTEMS 
FRAUD IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA AND EHRS 
John Sepulveda* 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
UNIVERSAL AMERICAN CORP. V. NATIONAL UNION FIRE 
INS. CO. OF PITTSBURGH, P.A.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Universal American Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. 
Co.,2 the New York Court of Appeals found that a rider for 
indemnification for losses due to computer systems fraud covers only 
the unauthorized use of the computer system and not fraudulent use 
by an authorized user.3  Universal American Corporation, a health 
insurance company, sought to indemnify itself from losses due to 
computer systems fraud by purchasing an insurance agreement from 
National Union Fire Insurance Company.4  The contract provided for 
coverage against losses incurred by an unauthorized user of the 
insured’s computer system who commits fraudulent acts.5  Within 
only a few months after purchasing this insurance agreement, 
Universal suffered losses from authorized users inputting fraudulent 
 
*J.D. Candidate 2017, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; M.B.A, Dowling 
College, 2002; B.S. in Electrical Engineering Technology, SUNY Farmingdale, 1997.  I 
would like to thank my devoted wife Ania and beloved daughter Alexandra, for all their 
support and love, without you this would not be possible.  Special thanks to my parents John 
and Mildred for their support and guidance.  Thanks to Julie Ansanelli and Jessica Vogele 
for helping me find my voice.  Finally, Dean Rodger Citron, who has provided me guidance 
and encouragement throughout.  
1 37 N.E.3d 78 (N.Y. 2015). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 79. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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data into Universal’s computer system.6  The Court of Appeals 
considered whether the insurance agreement for computer systems 
fraud applied to “a fraudulent entry . . . of Electronic Data or 
Computer Program” caused by an authorized user’s fraudulent acts.7  
It found that the contract precluded coverage for such losses, as the 
contract covered only the unauthorized use of the computer system.8  
The Court of Appeals’ holding in Universal alerts health insurance 
companies seeking to indemnify themselves against these kinds of 
losses that they should seek additional advice as to whether their 
current computer systems fraud rider offers the coverage they seek.  
The court’s holding in Universal also signals that health insurers 
should also explore obtaining other insurance policies and additional 
coverage. 
This case note will primarily discuss the decision in 
Universal, in which the Court of Appeals interpreted a rider for 
indemnification losses due to computer systems fraud to cover only 
unauthorized use of the system.  Ultimately, this case note will 
suggest that health insurance providers should purchase riders on 
their insurance policies that cover these losses.  This case note is 
divided into five parts.  Part II will outline the relevant facts, 
procedural history, and the Court of Appeals’ holding in Universal.  
Part III will analyze the various standards for fraudulent use and 
unauthorized users when dealing with computer fraud.  Part IV will 
discuss Universal’s possible remedies, which include various 
criminal and civil penalties against the providers that committed the 
fraud.  Part V will make recommendations regarding insurance 
contract provisions for the health care insurance industry to help 
mitigate the losses associated with computer-based insurance fraud. 
II.  UNIVERSAL AMERICAN CORP. V. NATIONAL UNION FIRE 
INSURANCE CO. OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 
The Court of Appeals in Universal found that a rider 
indemnifying the insured for losses from computer systems fraud 
covered only unauthorized use of the computer system and precluded 
coverage for losses incurred by an authorized user.9  The following 
 
6 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79. 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
2
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section will discuss the factual background, the procedural history, 
and the Court of Appeals’ discussion in Universal. 
A.  Factual Background 
Universal American Corp. (“Universal”) is a health insurance 
company that provides “Private Fee-For-Service” plans under 
Medicare Advantage or “Medicare Part C.”10  Medicare Advantage 
plans, in general, are government-regulated programs of managed 
health care that allow patients who are eligible for Medicare to 
purchase health insurance from private companies like Universal.11  
The most common types of Medicare Advantage Plans are HMOs 
(Health Maintenance Organizations), PPOs (Preferred Provider 
Organizations) and PFFS (Private-Fee-for-Service) plans.12  Patients 
with an HMO Plan are required to use health care providers in their 
network in order to have their care covered by the plan.13  On the 
other hand, patients covered under a PPO Plan may use health care 
providers outside of the network but may be required to pay more to 
do so.14  Finally, patients covered under a “Private Fee-For-Service” 
plan, like the one provided by Universal, can use their own health 
care provider, who then submits claims to the insurance company for 
 
10 Id. 
11 Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, How Medicare 
Advantage Plans Work, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicare-health-
plans/medicare-advantage-plans/how-medicare-advantage-plans-work.html (last visited Feb. 
10, 2017). 
12 Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Different types of 
Medicare Advantage Plans, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicare-
health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/types-of-medicare-advantage-plans.html (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2017). 
13 Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO) Plan, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-
plans/medicare-health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/hmo-plans.html (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017). 
14 Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Preferred Provider 
Organization (PPO) Plans, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicare-
health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/preferred-provider-organization-plans.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
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the health care services rendered.15  The Department of Health and 
Human Services reimburses the insurer for those services.16 
Universal utilizes a “computerized billing system that allows 
health care providers to submit claims directly to the system.”17  
Universal’s computer system automatically processes, approves, and 
pays the claims without first checking the authenticity of these 
claims.18  Universal purchased insurance coverage for a variety of 
losses from National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania (“National Union”), which is a provider of commercial 
and personal insurance coverage.19  Within only a few short months 
of obtaining coverage, Universal suffered more than $18 million in 
losses for fraudulent claims for health care services entered into 
Universal’s computer system that were never actually performed.20  
These fraudulent claims proliferated due to Universal’s automated 
computer system, which allowed health care providers to 
automatically receive their fee after entering their claims without any 
check to determine whether their services were actually performed.21  
Universal sought payment from National Union for these losses.22  
National Union denied coverage to Universal and claimed that the 
contract rider did not cover these losses.23  Specifically, National 
Union argued that these losses were standard insurance fraud and not 
the kind of “computer fraud” covered by the contract rider, which 
only covered losses resulting directly from “fraudulent . . . entry of 
Electronic Data” by unauthorized users.24  The contract rider reads as 
follows: 
Computer Systems Fraud 
Loss resulting directly from a fraudulent 
 
15 Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Private Fee-for-
Service (PFFS) Plans, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicare-health-
plans/medicare-advantage-plans/private-fee-for-service-plans.html (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017). 
16 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 80. 
21 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79. 
22 Id. at 80. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 79-80. 
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(1) entry of Electronic Data or Computer Program 
into, or 
(2) change of Electronic Data or Computer Program 
within 
the Insured’s proprietary Computer System or a 
Computer System listed in the Schedule below; . . . 
 
provided that the entry or change causes 
(a) Property to be transferred, paid or delivered, 
(b) An account of the Insured, or of its customer, to be 
added deleted, debited or credited or 
(c) An unauthorized account or a fictitious account to 
be debited or credited.25 
The Computer Systems Fraud Rider contained several exclusions: 
 (B) loss resulting directly or indirectly from 
negotiable instruments, securities, documents or other 
written instruments which bear a forged signature, or 
are counterfeit, altered or otherwise fraudulent and 
which are used as source documentation in the 
preparation of Electronic Data or manually keyed into 
a data terminal.26 
 
(D) loss resulting directly or indirectly from the input 
of Electronic Data into a Computer System terminal 
device either on the premises of a customer of the 
Insured or under the control of such a customer by a 
person who had authorized access to the customer’s 
authentication mechanism.27 
 
(E) loss resulting directly or indirectly from the theft 
of confidential information.28 
In other words, the subtitle, “Computer Systems,” covers the insured 
for losses resulting directly from entry of electronic data into 
Universal’s computer system, provided that the entry or changed data 
 
25 Id. at 79. 
26 Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 46-47, Universal American Corp. v. National Union 
Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, P.A., 2014 WL 10049066 (2014) (No. 2014-00133).  
27 Id. at *17-18. 
28 Id. at *51. 
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causes Universal to pay for a service.29  Next, under “Exclusions,” 
the rider expressly does not cover losses resulting directly or 
indirectly from fraudulent negotiable instruments bearing a false 
signature used as source documentation or from the input of 
electronic data on the premises of a customer of the insured by an 
authorized person or “from the theft of confidential information.”30  
Universal sued National Union for damages and declaratory relief 
because National Union refused to cover Universal’s losses.31 
B.  Procedural History 
Universal brought an action against National Union for breach 
of the contractual provision insuring against losses caused by 
computer systems fraud.32  Universal moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that the policy covered losses caused by fraudulent entry of 
claims which were never provided.33  National Union then cross-
moved for summary judgment34 on the grounds that the insurance 
policy was intended to insure only against losses due to computer 
hackers or unauthorized users.35 
The Supreme Court of New York County held that the 
language of the rider did not support Universal’s interpretation of the 
contract, denying Universal’s motion and granting National Union’s 
cross-motion.36  Universal appealed the trial court’s dismissal.37  The 
First Department affirmed as modified, and Universal appealed 
further to the New York Court of Appeals.38 
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed as well because it 
rejected Universal’s argument that an insurance agreement for 
computer systems fraud that applied to “a fraudulent entry of 
Electronic Data or Computer Program” encompasses the losses 
caused by an authorized user’s submission of fraudulent data into 
 
29 Id. at *6-7. 
30 Id. at *5. 
31 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 80. 
32 Universal American Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, 
P.A., 38 Misc. 3d 859, 860 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2013).    
33 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 80. 
34 Id. 
35 Universal, 38 Misc. 3d at 862. 
36 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 80. 
37 Id. at 79. 
38 Id. at 80. 
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Universal’s system.39  The court held that the agreement was 
“unambiguous and ‘fraudulent entry’ refers to unauthorized access 
into [Universal’s] computer system and not to content submitted by 
authorized users.”40 
C.  The Court of Appeals’ Reasoning 
In Universal, the New York Court of Appeals noted that “an 
insurance agreement is subject to principles of contract 
interpretation”41 as a matter of law.42  The court also acknowledged 
that the various provisions in “an insurance contract must be given 
their plain and ordinary meaning . . .”43  Relying on its previous 
decision in Mostow v. State Farm Insurance Cos.,44 the court held 
that the test for insurance contract ambiguity is “the reasonable 
expectations of the average insured . . . employing common 
speech.”45  In other words, a contract is ambiguous if the ordinary 
policyholder’s reasonable expectations could come to a different 
understanding of the terms than the insurance company.46  The court 
in Universal concluded that the rider’s language “unambiguously” 
applied to losses caused by unauthorized users of Universal’s 
computer system and not to losses resulting from fraudulent entry by 
an authorized user.47 
The court examined two features of the rider’s language in 
Universal.  First, the court found that the subtitle, “Computer 
Systems,” demonstrated that the focus of the rider was on the 
computer system as opposed to fraudulent content.48  Second, under 
“Exclusions,” the rider expressly did not cover losses resulting from 
fraudulent instruments “which are used as source documentation in 
the preparation of Electronic Data or manually keyed into a data 
 
39 Id. at 79-80. 
40 Id. at 79. 
41 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 80. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (citing Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bear Stearns, 10 N.Y.3d 170, 177 (2008), quoting 
Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bear Stearns Cos., Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 264, 267 (2007)). 
44 Mostow v. State Farm Ins. Companies, 88 N.Y.2d 321 (1996). 
45 Universal, 37 N.E.3d 81 (citing Mostow, 88 N.Y.2d at 327). 
46 Mostow, 88 N.Y.2d at 326-27. 
47 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81. 
48  Id. 
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terminal.”49  The court held that losses described under the 
“Exclusions” subtitle were considered billing fraud, as opposed to the 
computer fraud, which was covered by the contract rider.50  Judge 
Rivera, writing for the majority, emphasized that if Universal and 
National Union intended to cover billing fraud, there would have 
been no reason to exclude content from fraudulent instruments.51  
To assist in determining the intent of the coverage of the 
contract rider, the Court of Appeals in Universal also examined the 
ordinary definitions of “fraudulent,” “entry,” and “change,”52 which 
the contract rider did not define.53  The court looked to Merriam-
Webster, which defines (1) “fraudulent” as “deceit,”54 (2) “entry” as 
“the act of entering” or “the right or privilege of entering,”55 and (3) 
“change” as “to make different” or “alter.”56  Based on these 
definitions, the court concluded that “fraudulent” “qualifies the act of 
entering or changing data or a computer program.”57  The court 
determined that in order to rise to the level of fraudulence, the actor 
must have actively changed data or computer code, as opposed to 
merely using a computer to fraudulently submit claims for services 
never rendered. 
The New York Court of Appeals next examined Universal’s 
two principal arguments.  First, Universal argued that, for the 
purposes of the rider, “fraudulent entry” and “fraudulent input” had 
the same meaning, in contrast with National Union’s argument that 
the two terms did not have the same meaning.58  Specifically, since 
the health care providers that submitted fraudulent claims had 
inputted fraudulent data, Universal argued that fraudulent entry could 
only result from the inputting of fraudulent data.59  The court 
disagreed with Universal and held that these terms did not have the 
same meaning due to the rider’s language, which stated that coverage 
was limited to “[l]oss resulting directly from a fraudulent (1) entry of 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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Electronic Data or Computer Program . . . .”60  As such, treating the 
terms “fraudulent entry” and “fraudulent input” as synonyms would 
ignore the application of the remaining language contained in the 
rider to “Computer Systems Fraud.”61  This intentional placement of 
the word “fraudulent” before the word “entry” demonstrated the 
parties’ intent to have the rider cover use of the computer system 
through “deceitful and dishonest access.”62 
Second, Universal argued that the court should base its 
decision on the Superior Court of Connecticut’s decision in Owens, 
Schine & Nicola, P.C. v. Travelers Casualty and Surety of America.63  
In Owens, the court held that the term “computer systems fraud” in a 
contract “can reasonably be interpreted to encompass fraud 
committed through a computer.”64  There, the plaintiff, Owens, 
Schine & Nicola, P.C. (“Owens”), purchased an insurance contract 
from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company (“Travelers”).65  The 
insurance contract in this case included a “Computer Fraud” 
provision66 and also defined computer fraud in its rider as “[t]he use 
of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of Money, Securities 
or Other Property from inside the Premises or Banking Premises 
. . . .”67  In Owens, the computer did not cause the actual transfer of 
funds but instead the fraudster used the computer to send several e-
mails, which then tricked Owens into transferring the funds.68  
Specifically, after the parties exchanged a series of e-mails, the 
fraudster executed a retainer agreement with Owens.69  Owens was 
then sent a check for $198,610.00 and was directed by e-mail to 
deposit the check and wire $197,110.00 to the fraudster’s South 
Korean account.70  The check was later determined to be fraudulent 
by Wachovia Bank and was not honored.71  Owens’ IOLTA account 
 
60 Id. at 79-81. 
61 Id. at 81 (stating “Universal’s proposed interpretation is easily achieved by providing 
coverage for a ‘loss resulting directly from fraudulent data’ ”). 
62 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81. 
63 Owens, Schine & Nicola, P.C. v. Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. of Am., 2010 WL 
4226958 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010). 
64 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81-82 (discussing Owens, 2010 WL 4226958 at *1). 
65 Owens, 2010 WL 4226958 at *1. 
66 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 82. 
67 Id. 
68 Owens, 2010 WL 4226958 at *1-2.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. at *1. 
71 Id. at *2. 
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was debited the $197,110.00, at which point Owens submitted a 
claim to Travelers under the Computer Fraud provisions of their 
insurance policy.72  The question became whether, in light of the 
parties’ reasonable interpretation of the terms, the computer, which 
was not used to input fraudulent data but to send emails that would 
later induce fraud, was one of the primary factors in causing this 
computer fraud.73  The court in Universal was unpersuaded by 
Universal’s reliance on Owens, as Owens focused more on whether a 
computer had been used in such a way to constitute computer fraud.74  
In Universal, the computer was clearly used in a manner that resulted 
in payment for claims for services that were never provided because 
all of the fraudulent entries were directly entered by computer into 
Universal’s Computer System.75 
The Supreme Court of New York County in Universal relied 
primarily on Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. v. Chubb Group of 
Insurance Cos.,76 a New Jersey state appellate case regarding the 
interpretation of a “Computer Systems” insuring agreement.77  In 
Morgan Stanley, the insurance company denied coverage, stating that 
there was no “fraudulent input” because the customer who entered 
the fraudulent instructions was an authorized user of Morgan 
Stanley’s computer system.78  The contract contained a provision that 
indemnified the insured for losses arising out of the fraudulent input 
of electronic data.79  This provision was subject to an exclusion that 
explicitly barred loss from an authorized user.80  The court held that, 
 
72 Id. 
73 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 82. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 79.  “The matter before us involves Universal’s demand for indemnification to 
cover losses resulting from health care claims for unprovided services, paid through 
Universal’s computer system.”  Id.  
76 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Companies, 2004 WL 
5352285 (N.J. Super. L. 2004). 
77 Id. at *5-6. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at *2. 
80  Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Companies, 2005 WL 
3242234, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 2, 2005):  
The computer systems insuring agreement was subject to Exclusion (q), 
which provides that the agreement does not cover ‘loss by reason of the 
input of Electronic Data at an authorized electronic terminal . . . or a 
Customer Communication System by a customer or other person who 
had authorized access . . . .’ Thus, the exclusion, which seems clear and 
10
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pursuant to this exclusion, there was no fraudulent input because the 
customer was an authorized user at an authorized terminal.81  The 
court in Universal found Morgan Stanley instructive because, as in 
Universal, the contract specified that it did not provide coverage for 
authorized users who entered fraudulent data.82 
  Ultimately, in Universal, the New York Court of Appeals 
concluded that the contract rider that insured against “Computer 
Fraud” did not apply to losses from the data submitted by authorized 
users, even though computers were used to commit fraud; instead, the 
contract rider only applies to “hacking.”83 
III.  FRAUDULENT ACTS VERSUS UNAUTHORIZED USERS 
An issue that arises from the inclusion of computer systems 
fraud riders in insurance contracts is whether the party that 
committed fraud was an otherwise authorized user of the covered 
computer system at the time he committed the fraudulent act.  The 
New York Court of Appeals in Universal might have reached a 
different conclusion had it considered the following facts with respect 
to whether the contract rider covered fraud committed by authorized 
users: (1) the insurance industry defines computer fraud in a manner 
contrary to the hacker-centric definition provided by the court in 
Universal, (2) authorized users can commit fraudulent acts, (3) the 
terms “fraudulent” and “unauthorized” are not synonymous, and (4) 
computer fraud does not require high tech “hacking.” 
The hacker-centric definition provided by the court in 
Universal is contrary to the definition used in the insurance industry 
for computer fraud.  The International Risk Management Institute, a 
major insurance educational organization, defines “Computer 
Systems Fraud” insurance as covering “loss resulting from fraudulent 
input or alteration of electronic data or computer programs within the 
insured’s computer system by a nonemployee.”84  This definition is in 
 
unambiguous, excludes coverage for fraud committed by customers or 
other authorized persons. 
Id.  
81  Id. at *5. 
82 Universal, 38 Misc. 3d at 863-64. 
83 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81. 
84 Brief for United Policyholders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 8-9, 
Universal Am. Corp. v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., 37 N.E.3d 73 (2015) 
(No. 2014-00133).  
11
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line with the definition proposed by Universal, yet is contrary to the 
Court of Appeals’ interpretation.85  The Court of Appeals defines 
computer fraud as “wrongful acts in manipulation of the computer 
system, i.e. by hackers.”86  There were no hackers in Universal.87  
The facts instead comport with the International Risk Management 
Institute’s definition because Universal suffered losses resulting from 
fraudulent input within Universal’s computer system by health care 
providers who were non-employees.88  In other words, if the court in 
Universal had used the industry definition, the court would have held 
that there was computer systems fraud due to the input of fraudulent 
data by service providers or vendors who were not employees of the 
insured.89  
An additional point that the court in Universal failed to 
consider is that an authorized user can commit fraudulent acts.  In 
Universal, the Court of Appeals insisted that the two terms were 
mutually exclusive, which resulted in its characterization of the 
health care providers as authorized users.90  In contrast, the United 
States District Court, Eastern District Michigan, Southern Division in 
United States v. Khan, 91 held that a user may be authorized and still 
commit fraudulent acts.92  In Khan, the health care provider, Amjad 
Khan, and his associates submitted false claims for health care 
benefits and services.93  The health care provider in Khan was an 
authorized user but the court nonetheless held that these false claims 
rose to the level of fraud because Khan, as a health care provider, was 
authorized to seek reimbursement from Medicare but fraudulently 
sought this reimbursement by presenting false statements.94  
Specifically, the health care provider’s fraudulent acts included 
submitting “[f]raudulent entries in cost reports and supporting 
documentation submitted to Medicare by AHHC.”95  In Universal, 
the health care insurer similarly received false claims by authorized 
 
85 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81. 
86 Id. at 80. 
87 Universal, 38 Misc. 3d at 861. 
88 Id. 
89 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79. 
90 Id. 
91 United States v. Khan, 2008 WL 2782669 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
92 Id. at *1. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at *2. 
12
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users for services not provided.96  The court should have compared 
the facts in Universal to the facts in Khan and then based its decision, 
at least in part, on the reasoning of Khan.  Similarly, in People v. 
Severino,97 the defendant, a nursing home business manager, made 
fraudulent entries in applying for Medicaid reimbursement.98  There, 
the defendant fraudulently listed over $63,000.00 in expenditures as 
incurred during patient care.99  The defendant’s wife and son owned 
the nursing home and employed the defendant there.100  The New 
York Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment convicting the defendant of offering a false 
instrument and grand larceny.101  As in Universal, the fraudsters in 
Severino were authorized users of the system.102  The court in 
Universal should have ruled in Universal’s favor because the 
authorized users in Universal, like the authorized users in Severino 
and Khan, used the computer system in a fraudulent manner by 
submitting false claims. 
The outcome in Universal would have been different had the 
court not interpreted the words “fraudulent” and “unauthorized” as 
synonymous.  The First Department in Waters v. Horace Waters & 
Co.103  held that the terms “fraudulent” and “unauthorized” are not 
synonymous because an individual can be authorized to do a 
fraudulent action.104  In Waters, a stockholder brought an action to 
cancel some shares of treasury stock.105  The corporation issued the 
stocks at par value to an older employee and officer of the 
corporation to ensure his retention.106  Although stocks were given to 
the employee-stockholder, she was not offered the opportunity to 
subscribe to a proportionate part of the three shares.107  The court 
 
96 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79. 
97 People v. Severino, 63 A.D.2d 1010 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1978). 
98 Id. at 1010. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id.  
102 Severino, 63 A.D.2d at 1010. 
103 Waters v. Horace Waters & Co., 130 A.D. 678 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1909) aff’d, 201 
N.Y. 184 (1911).  
104 Id. at 685 (stating “[u]nauthorized acts are not necessarily fraudulent”). 
105 Id. at 683. 
106 Id. at 684. 
107 Id. at 684-85.  
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held that the issuance of the three shares constituted fraud,108 even 
though the corporation was authorized to issue them.109  On the other 
hand, the court in Universal held that the coverage extended only to 
“wrongful acts in manipulation of the computer system, i.e. by 
hackers,” not by authorized users.110  Though the health care 
providers were authorized users of the system, it is arguable that they 
committed fraudulent acts by making claims for services never 
rendered.  If the court had not interpreted the terms “fraudulent” and 
“unauthorized” as synonyms, the court may have held similarly to 
Waters on the issue of computer fraud.  Such an interpretation is 
consistent with the plain text of the rider, which covered “[l]loss 
resulting directly from a fraudulent (1) entry of Electronic Data or 
Computer Program,” as opposed to the current interpretation as 
unauthorized entry.111 
Had the Court of Appeals interpreted the contract provisions 
not to require a “computer hacking incident” for indemnification 
against losses, the policy would have covered Universal for losses 
incurred due to fraudulent claim submissions in its computer system.  
In Owens, the court held “that a computer hacking incident” was not 
a requirement for coverage in a policy indemnifying losses caused by 
computer fraud.112  No “computer hacking incident” had taken place; 
instead, the fraudulent act was the direct result of the third party who 
had communicated with Owens electronically.113  The insured sought 
coverage under a provision that allowed indemnification for losses 
due to computer fraud and that required only “the use of any 
computer” in committing such fraud.114  Similar to the policy in 
Universal, the contract in Owens did not use the words “hacking” or 
“unauthorized user.”115  In Universal, the traditional computer hacker 
did not commit the hacking, and the contract did not use the term 
hacking; instead, an authorized user caused the fraud by submitting 
 
108 Waters, 103 A.D. at 686.  “[T]he issue of the three shares was fraudulent. It was a 
fraud on the corporation.”  Id.  
109 Id.  “The corporation has the right to bring an action to cancel said shares as 
fraudulently issued . . . [and] is in the control of the trustees who issued the shares.”  Id.  
110 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 80. 
111 Id. at 79. 
112 Owens, 2010 WL 4226958 at *7. 
113 Id. at *8. 
114 Id. at *7-8. 
115 Id. at *8.  
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fraudulent claims within the computer system.116  If the court in 
Universal had interpreted the contract using the same criteria as the 
court in Owens, the contract would have covered Universal for the 
fraudulent acts, which were the result of providers committing fraud 
using Universal’s computer system. 
Ultimately, in light of these cases, the court in Universal 
might have come to a different conclusion had it taken into account 
that: (1) fraudulent acts can be committed by authorized users; (2) the 
terms “fraudulent” and “unauthorized” are not synonymous; and (3) 
computer fraud does not necessarily require hacking—the mere use 
of a computer in an authorized manner to assist in committing fraud 
is sufficient.  First, the insurance industry defines “Computer 
Systems Fraud” as covering losses “resulting from fraudulent input 
. . . within the insured’s computer system by a nonemployee.”117  In 
Universal, the perpetrators of the fraud were neither employees nor 
customers; they were service providers or vendors that contracted 
with Universal.118  Second, authorized users, such as doctors and 
other health care providers like the ones in Universal, can commit 
fraudulent acts in an insured’s system by submitting fraudulent 
expenditures.  An act can be fraudulent and authorized at the same 
time—merely because users are authorized to use a system does not 
mean that they are authorized to utilize the system to commit fraud.  
Although Universal authorized its health care providers to enter 
claims into its system, Universal did not authorize the submission of 
fraudulent data in its system.119  Third, the commission of computer 
fraud does not require traditional hacking of a computer system to 
commit fraud.  In Universal, fraudulent acts were the result of 
providers committing fraud using Universal’s computer system.120  
The fraudulent acts were not the result of traditional “hacking,” but 
by the service providers simply entering fraudulent claims for 
services that they never provided.121 
 
116 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 78-80.  
117 Brief for United Policyholders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 8-9, 
Universal Am. Corp. v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., 37 N.E.3d 73 (2015) 
(No. 2014-00133). 
118 Universal, 37, N.E.3d at 78-79. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 78. 
121 Id. at 80. 
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IV.  HEALTH CARE FRAUD PENALTIES 
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Universal, which confirms 
that insurance will not cover Universal’s losses, leaves Universal 
with few remaining remedies, all of which require pursuit of the 
various health care providers that committed the fraud.  In Universal, 
the health care providers were authorized users of the insured’s 
system for submitting claims.122  Health care insurers such as 
Universal have the following remedies available against those 
committing health care fraud: 1) criminal penalties for fraud under 
Title 18 of the United States Code section 1347;123  2) both civil and 
criminal penalties under the Federal False Claims Act, 31 United 
States Code section 3729, for defrauding the government;124 3) civil 
and criminal penalties under the New York False Claims Act,125 for 
filing fraudulent claims; 4) civil and criminal penalties under New 
York Consolidated Laws Social Services Law section 145,126 for 
filing fraudulent claims; and finally 5) a lawsuit in state court 
alleging fraud.127  However, due to the relatively small damages 
caused by each individual perpetrating fraud, and the high cost of 
prosecuting those committing the fraud, Universal will have 
difficulty persuading the government to prosecute these 
individuals.128 
A.  Criminal Penalties 
The criminal penalties against health care providers 
committing health care fraud allow for prison, fines, and 
restitution.129  Criminal penalties as a remedy are difficult for victims 
of health care fraud to obtain because criminal prosecution is at the 
 
122 Id. at 78.  
123 See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010). 
124 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2011). 
125 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 187-194 (McKinney 2013). 
126 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 145(b) (McKinney 2007). 
127 See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2011); N.Y. SOC. SERV. Law 
§ 145-b (McKinney 2007); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 187-194 (McKinney 2013). 
128 See Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 78. 
129 See 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a)(1) (2010); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 145-b (McKinney 2007).  
See also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2011). 
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discretion of the government130 and aggrieved parties cannot initiate 
the criminal claims.  The government may initiate criminal claims in 
one of three ways: (1) an indictment voted by a grand jury; (2) the 
filing of “an information” by a prosecuting district or state’s attorney 
alleging that the crime was committed; or (3) the filing of a criminal 
complaint, which petitions the district attorney to initiate the 
charges.131 
District Attorneys can prosecute health care fraud under 
various sections of Title 18 of the United States Code.132  Health care 
fraud is defined under Title 18 as an act “to defraud any health care 
benefit program; or (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money or property 
owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care benefit 
program[.]”133  Depending on the injury sustained as a result of the 
fraud, the law provides up to life imprisonment and significant fines 
of $250,000 for an individual or $500,000 for organizations.134  One 
of the difficulties in pursuing this remedy is that the government must 
prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.135  The 
statute also requires the government to initiate the action, although 
the statute allows the aggrieved party to request the government to 
initiate it.136  
Both the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Department 
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) have cited limited funding as 
a significant problem in pursuing health insurance fraud.137  
Traditionally, limited funding has hampered the investigation and 
prosecution of health care fraud, but the issue regarding funding has 
 
130 How Courts Work, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_netw
ork/how_courts_work/bringingcharge.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
131 Id.  
132 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) (2010). 
133 Id. 
134 Id.; Appeals of Healthcare and Medicare Fraud Convictions, THE L. OFFICE OF C.F. 
COWAN, PLLC, https://www.federalcriminalappeal.lawyer/federal-appeals-of-health-care-
fraud-and-medicare-fraud-convicti.html (last visited Jul. 8, 2016). 
135 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010); United States v. Javan, 383 Fed. Appx. 596, 599 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“The Government presented evidence sufficient for a rational juror to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Javan ‘knowingly and willfully’ intended to defraud health insurers . . . 
.”). 
136 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010).  
137 Janet Shikles, Health Insurance More Resources Needed to Combat Fraud and Abuse, 
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (July 28, 1992), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/104703.pdf. 
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changed in recent times.138  The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) has 
increased funding for anti-fraud investigations.139  In 2007, the 
federal government created Medicare Fraud Strike Forces,140 a joint 
program between the DOJ and HHS, in which DOJ prosecutors 
collaborate with agents from HHS’s Office of Inspector General to 
investigate allegations of fraud to allow Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to suspend payments to providers 
suspected of committing fraud.141  However, only 10 out of the 94 
judicial districts are designated as Strike Force Districts, and these 
are too few.142  These judicial districts each see an average of only 42 
people a year charged with health care fraud.143  Comparatively, in 
2014, CMS had found that over 17,000 providers committed fraud.144 
B.  Civil Penalties 
Civil penalties are also available against “authorized users” 
committing health care fraud.  Civil penalties exist under the Federal 
False Claims Act,145 the New York False Claims Act State Finance 
Law,146 and New York Consolidated Laws Social Services Law.147  
The aggrieved party may initiate civil penalties under the 
aforementioned statutes.148  However, such penalties may be too 
expensive or burdensome to realize because the damages from the 
 
138 U.S. Attorney Ramping Up Health Care Enforcement in Western Penn., COALITION 
AGAINST INSURANCE FRAUD (Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.insurancefraud.org/IFNS-
detail.htm?key=21046.  
139 Id.; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). 
140 Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services: Office of the 
Inspector General, Medicare Fraud Strike Force, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/strike-force/ (last 
updated June 30, 2016). 
141 Id.  
142 Id.; Informational Brochure, United States Courts, Court Role and Structure, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure (last visited Aug. 5, 
2016). 
143 U.S. Attorney Ramping Up Health Care Enforcement in Western Penn., COALITION 
AGAINST INSURANCE FRAUD, http://www.insurancefraud.org/IFNS-detail.htm?key=21046 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2015).  
144 The $272 billion swindle, THE ECONOMIST (May 31, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21603078-why-thieves-love-americas-health-
care-system-272-billion-swindle.  “Since tighter screening was introduced under Obamacare, 
the CMS has stripped 17,000 providers of their licence to bill Medicare.”  Id.  
145 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2009).  
146 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 187-194 (McKinney 2013). 
147 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 145-b (McKinney 2007). 
148 Id. 
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individual incidents of fraud would be very small, and litigation costs 
are relatively high.149  Additionally, a victim of fraud can seek 
damages as well as restitution by filing a fraud claim in state court.150 
The Federal False Claims Act151 is a federal statute that 
imposes liability on those who defraud government programs.152  
Specifically, the act provides for a civil penalty between $5,000 and 
$10,000 “plus 3 times the amount in damages which the Government 
sustains because of the act of that person.”153  The False Claims Act 
has a whistle blower provision, referred to as qui tam relator,154 
which allows people not affiliated with the government to file an 
action on behalf of the government.155  The provision rewards the 
whistleblower, or relator, with a percentage of the money that the 
government recovers because of the qui tam lawsuit.156  Persons 
filing under the act can receive between 10% and 30% of any 
recovered damages.157  The statute also provides for the recovery of 
costs of litigation by the U.S. Government.158  This statute has a 6-
year statute of limitations.159 
New York law imposes civil penalties against those 
committing fraud as well.  The New York False Claims Act holds 
liable individuals that file false claims for payment from any state or 
local government.160  First, under the New York False Claims Act, 
the New York Attorney General, an individual, or a local government 
may file a lawsuit against a person that obtains funds from the state 
or local government through fraudulent conduct.161  Fraudulent 
conduct includes knowingly making false statements or false records 
 
149 By The Numbers: Fraud Statistics, COALITION AGAINST INSURANCE FRAUD, 
http://www.insurancefraud.org/statistics.htm#.Vlpkc4S0HOw (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).  
“Health care organizations recorded an average cost of $398 per breached record . . . .”  Id.  
150 Informational Brochure, U.S. Attorney’s Office N.D. of Ga, Understanding 
Restitution, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/victim-witness-assistance/understanding-
restitution (last updated Apr. 17, 2015). 
151 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2011). 
152 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2011). 
153 Id. 
154 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2011). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 31 U.S.C. § 3731 (2011). 
160 N.Y.  STATE FIN. LAW § 189 (McKinney 2013). 
161 N.Y.  STATE FIN. LAW § 190 (McKinney 2013).  
19
Sepulveda: Computer Systems Fraud
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
560 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
to obtain payments for a claim from the government.162  The New 
York False Claims Act makes liable anyone who: 
(a) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;  
(b) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or 
used, a false record or statement material to a false or 
fraudulent claim;163  
Like the federal statute, the New York False Claims Act includes a 
qui tam provision, which allows a whistle blower to receive between 
15% and 30% of the amount recovered.164  The penalty under this 
statute is between $6,000 and $12,000 per claim, and the perpetrator 
may be responsible for the government’s legal fees.165  The statute of 
limitations is 10 years, which is longer than the federal statute’s 6-
year statute of limitations.166  Additionally, New York Consolidated 
Laws Social Services Law section 145-b creates civil penalties for 
false claims.167  This statute defines a false statement as “a claim for 
payment made to the state . . . or an entity performing services under 
contract to the state . . . which serves as the basis for a claim or a rate 
of payment . . . [for] health care services.”168  Section 145-b allows 
for the recovery of treble damages as well as monetary penalties that 
can be as high as $30,000 per claim for repeat violations.169 
A defrauded health insurer may also commence a lawsuit in 
state court seeking damages for fraud from the individual service 
providers who committed the fraud.  Damages for fraud include 
nominal damages, which are awarded when the party has not suffered 
substantial loss and are often a small monetary sum,170 and punitive 
damages, which are intended to punish the defendant.171  In either 
case, pursuing many individual service providers is likely to incur 
 
162 N.Y.  STATE FIN. LAW § 189 (McKinney 2013). 
163 Id. 
164 N.Y.  STATE FIN. LAW § 190 (McKinney 2013).  
165 N.Y.  STATE FIN. LAW § 189 (McKinney 2013). 
166 N.Y.  STATE FIN. LAW § 192 (McKinney 2010).  
167 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 145-b (McKinney 2007). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 48 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1984) 
(stating “[t]he three basic types of legal damages are compensatory, nominal, and punitive”). 
171 Id. 
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considerable litigation expenses.172  It is costly for health insurance 
companies to litigate lawsuits against numerous service providers 
who cause relatively small amounts of economic injury, as compared 
with the much lower cost of litigating a lawsuit against one large 
defendant, such as National Union.173 
Health insurers that suffer losses from computer systems 
fraud only have these remedies available to them, and most of these 
remedies are either too difficult or not cost-effective to pursue. The 
criminal penalties require government cooperation, and civil penalties 
require expensive litigation against numerous service providers.  For 
these reasons, health insurers are left with no good options.174 
V.  PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section will discuss how electronic records facilitate the 
commission of health care computer systems fraud, as well as make 
some preliminary recommendations for health insurers to avoid 
losses due to fraud, such as providing insurance coverage to health 
insurers for fraud committed specifically by authorized users.  
Because of the difficulties that a health insurer faces in pursuing 
litigation against the individual committing the fraud, and the ease 
with which fraud may be accomplished, the need for health insurance 
companies like Universal to properly insure themselves becomes 
paramount.  The following three features of electronic health care 
records (“EHRs”) increase the ease with which health care fraud is 
accomplished: (1) the mandated use and proliferation of EHRs; (2) 
the electronic nature of EHRs; and (3) the complexity of electronic 
datasets, termed “big data.”  The mandated use and proliferation of 
EHRs make it easier to commit fraud than with paper health care 
records.  The electronic nature of EHRs creates an inherent 
susceptibility to manipulation that could make fraud more difficult to 
detect using current technology because of the size and complexity of 
the datasets.175  This section will discuss how health care providers 
 
172 Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_online2.ashx. 
173 Universal, 37 N.E.3d 78. 
174 Other than negotiating better contract provisions.  See infra section VI. 
175 Manipulation of 12,000 Medical Records Made Easy by EHR, HEALTH CARE RENEWAL 
BLOG (July 7, 2012), http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/07/manipulation-of-12000-
medical-records.html.  “This is another area where electronic records make possible tasks 
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should ensure that their computer fraud indemnification riders protect 
them against losses incurred by “authorized users” utilizing their 
access to the system to commit insurance fraud. 
The recent proliferation of electronic health care records 
(“EHRs”)176 is partially driven by mandates in the ACA,177 which is 
designed to promote the “meaningful use” of electronic health care 
records, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA), which is designed to increase federal funding for health 
care technology.178  “Meaningful use” is a program for Medicare that 
seeks to increase EHR usage by having health care providers show 
that they are using certified EHR technology.179  The ACA mandates 
an increase in the number of hospitals and doctors that utilize 
EHRs.180  Moreover, “meaningful use” sets objectives that health care 
providers must achieve in order to qualify for CMS financial 
incentive programs created by the ARRA.181 
There are three stages of “meaningful use” objectives of the 
ACA, the first of which started in 2011, and the last of which is 
scheduled to end in 2018.182  In Stage 1, the objective is data capture 
and sharing.183  This means eligible providers received funding to 
improve their electronic data capture and sharing of medical 
records.184  This includes electronically capturing health care 
information, utilizing the captured health care information to track 
 
that are probably impossible with paper. Altering 11,000+ records would be hard in paper 
charts, as the alterations would likely stick out in a pronounced manner.”  Id.  
176 Informational Brochure, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Electronic Health 
Records (EHR) Incentive Programs, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/index.html?redirect=/EHRIncentivePrograms/
01_Overview.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2016) [hereinafter “Electronic Health Records”]. 
177 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). 
178 Electronic Health Records, supra note 179. 
179 What is Meaningful Use, HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.hrsa.gov/healthit/meaningfuluse/MU%20Stage1%20CQM/mu.html# (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2016) (“Simply put, ‘meaningful use’ means providers need to show they’re 
using certified EHR technology in ways that can be measured significantly in quality and in 
quantity.”). 
180 42 U.S.C. § 3007 (2010). 
181 Informational Brochure, HealthIT, Meaningful Use Definition & Objectives, 
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/meaningful-use-definition-objectives (last 
updated Feb. 6, 2015) [hereinafter “HealthIT”].  
182 Id.; Electronic Health Records, supra note 179. 
183 HealthIT, supra note 184. 
184 Informational Brochure, Aetna Health, Meaningful Use Knowledge Hub, 
http://www.athenahealth.com/knowledge-hub/meaningful-use/stages (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017). 
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clinical conditions, and reporting of clinical quality measures and 
public health information.185  The objective in Stage 2 is to utilize the 
EHRs for advanced clinical processes.186  Health care providers will 
receive additional funding for extending their “EHR capabilities to a 
larger portion of their patient populations.”187  The objective in Stage 
3 is to utilize EHRs to improve patient outcomes.188  To meet the 
objective of Stage 3, health care providers will have to use EHRs to 
improve the results of the medical care a patient receives.189  To 
qualify for the CMS Medicaid EHR Incentive Program, the health 
care provider must “adopt, implement, upgrade or meaningfully use 
certified EHR technology . . . .”190  The effect of these “meaningful 
use” objectives is that federal funding to health care providers to 
meet these objectives increases the use of EHRs.  As will be 
discussed further below, this increase in EHRs means an increase in 
the ability of health care providers to commit fraud.  
Since the passage of both the ACA and the ARRA, EHR 
utilization has seen predicted increases, which have translated into 
considerable “meaningful use” fraud.191  “Meaningful use” fraud 
occurs when health care providers receive federal funds under this 
program even though they are not actually complying with the 
“meaningful use” requirements but rather gaming the system.192  
CMS’s financial incentives have provided an additional means for 
health care providers to commit fraud by utilizing EHRs.  The CMS 
 
185 Informational Brochure, HealthIT, How to Attain Meaningful Use, 
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/how-attain-meaningful-use (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2017). 
186 HealthIT, supra note 184. 
187 HealthIT, supra note 184. 
188 HealthIT, supra note 184. 
189 HealthIT, supra note 184. 
190 Informational Brochure, CMS, Medicaid Electronic Health Record Incentive Payments 
for Eligible Professionals, CMS (May 2013), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/MLN_MedicaidEHRProgram_Ti
pSheet_EP.pdf. 
191 Mark Hagland, Hospital Fined $4.4 Million for Meaningful Use Fraud, HEALTH CARE 
INFORMATICS, (May 4, 2015), http://www.health care-informatics.com/news-item/hospital-
cfo-fined-44-million-meaningful-use-fraud (“A former hospital CFO has been fined $4.4 
million for defrauding the federal government through the directing of staff to falsely attest 
to meaningful use under the HITECH (Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health) Act.”). 
192 Kyle Murphy, Meaningful use fraud: HHS, DOJ Issue Warning, EHR INTELLIGENCE 
(Sept. 25, 2012), https://ehrintelligence.com/news/meaningful-use-fraud-hhs-doj-issue-
warning/. 
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Medicaid EHR Incentive Program is a “pay-and-chase” system.193  A 
“pay-and-chase” system means that CMS pays a claim to health care 
providers, knowing that a third party is likely responsible for the 
claim and then attempts to recover the payment.194  Health care 
providers can then submit fraudulent claims, and CMS may not seek 
recovery of the money.195 
The EHRs’ electronic nature makes fraudulent entry relatively 
easy for service providers196 because it allows authorized users to 
commit fraud without having to resort to traditional hacking, which 
involves the modification of computer code that is outside of the 
original programmer’s objective.197  Moreover, EHR fraud is easier to 
disguise because the volume and the velocity of the data that an EHR 
may submit facilitate the capacity to commit fraud in a non-
traditional manner.198 
Additionally, EHRs allow for easy “copy and paste” or 
“cloning” fraud,199 which occurs when the health care provider 
duplicates clinical notes by electronically copying them from one 
account and pasting them into another.200  While this technique 
allows for quicker data entry, cloning makes it easy for health care 
providers to bill for work not performed by simply borrowing clinical 
notes from another patient’s record.201  Also, a survey of all 864 
hospitals that received subsidies for EHR systems as of March 2012 
found that only 24% of hospitals have any sort of policy regulating 
 
193 Heather Caspi, How Common is Meaningful Use Fraud, HEALTH CARE DIVE (June 24, 
2015), http://www.health caredive.com/news/how-common-is-meaningful-use-
fraud/401261.  
194 Karen Fletcher, Medicare Now Required to Check for Fraud Before Paying Claims, 
CALIFORNIA HEALTH ADVOCATES (Oct. 2004), 
http://blog.cahealthadvocates.org/2010/10/medicare-checks-for-fraud-before-paying/.  
195 Electronic Health Records, supra note 179. 
196 Joe Carlson, Feds Eye Crackdown on Cut-and-Paste EHR Fraud, MODERN HEALTH 
CARE (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.modernhealth 
care.com/article/20131210/NEWS/312109965. 
197 Easy Definition of Hacking, CYBER LAWS, http://cyber.laws.com/hacking (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2016). 
198 Joe Carlson, supra note 199 (“ ‘Certain EHR documentation features, if . . . used 
inappropriately, can result in poor data quality or fraud,’ according a report from HHS’ 
Office of the Inspector General.”). 
199 Joe Carlson, supra note 199.  
200 Robert Wayde & Alex Krouse, EHRs: Upcoding, Overpayment and the False Claims 
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proper use of copy and paste.202  The ability of health care providers 
to commit fraud increases with the lack of hospital policies that 
govern cloning, the ease at which the fraud goes undetected, and the 
ease of accomplishing cloning.203 
Another possible source of fraud in EHRs occurs when 
service providers “upcode” or “upcharge.”204  Upcoding and 
upcharging occur when an insurance provider is charged for a more 
expensive service than what was provided,205 which can be done by 
changing the medical billing code or by simply fraudulently pasting 
the data from a more expensive test or procedure into a patient’s 
record.206  In 2012, the New York Times found that there was “a 
surge in Medicare spending on the most costly services” entered 
using EHRs.207  Moreover, a study by the Office of Inspector 
General, Department of Health and Human Services, found that 
neither CMS nor its contractors had adjusted their policies for 
detecting fraud to encompass the new threats brought by EHRs.208  In 
this study, the Inspector General found that very few of its 
contractors could properly detect “whether a provider had copied 
language or overdocumented in a medical record.”209 
The proliferation of EHRs in the era of big data makes it 
easier for health care providers to commit health care fraud.210  The 
term “big data” encompasses data sets that are so complex that 
traditional data processing applications are inadequate.211  The 
complexity of big data can create many challenges within security, 
analysis, or privacy.212  Specifically, security and analysis are 
problematic because even though modern computing infrastructure 
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allows for real-time anomaly detection, the volume and variety of the 
data streams may either lead to false positives or miss anomalies 
altogether.213  Privacy is an issue because even though the large 
volume of data can be anonymized, those that intend on committing 
fraud easily identify the user that created the data or to which patient 
the data belongs.214  The volume, velocity, and variety of the data 
likewise make processing the data extremely challenging.  The 
volume of the data makes the process of detecting fraudulent data 
from authorized users difficult because of the large amount of 
computing power required to process this large amount of 
information.215  According to The Economist, “[t]he amount of digital 
information increases tenfold every five years.”216  The velocity,217 or 
speed at which users enter the data,  makes it difficult to detect 
fraudulent data even from “authorized users” because the data arrive 
too quickly and in such large volumes that the computer system is 
unable to utilize traditional methods of analysis to detect fraud.218  
The data’s variety also makes it hard to detect fraudulent data from 
authorized users, rendering older models for security obsolete.219 
Because Universal’s computerized system allowed for direct 
submission of claims to the system and the vast majority of claims 
are processed, approved, and paid automatically, the above “big data” 
paradigm applies.220  One does not need to be a high-tech hacker to 
commit health care insurance computer fraud; a mere “authorized 
user” can commit “fraudulent entry.” 
Thus, to keep up with rapidly advancing technology, health 
care providers should ensure that their computer fraud 
indemnification riders specifically and unambiguously protect them 
against losses incurred by “authorized users” utilizing their access to 
the system to commit insurance fraud.  To protect against lawsuits 
 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Kenneth Cukier, Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/15557443.  
216 Id.   
217 Merriam-Webster, Velocity, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/velocity 
(last visited Nov., 28, 2015). 
218 Top Ten, supra note 214 (“traditional security mechanisms, which are tailored to 
securing small-scale 
static (as opposed to streaming) data, are inadequate.”). 
219 Drew Robb, Cyber Security’s Big Data Problem, E-SECURITY PLANET (Dec. 3, 2014), 
http://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-security/cyber-securitys-big-data-problem.html. 
220 Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79. 
26
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 2, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss2/11
2017 COMPUTER SYSTEMS FRAUD  567 
similar to Universal and Morgan Stanley, health insurance providers 
seeking to indemnify themselves against losses incurred by 
authorized users should expressly include fraudulent claims by 
authorized users in the definition of computer fraud. 
The insurance industry should offer insurance that provides 
coverage against losses due to authorized users submitting fraudulent 
claims.  An insurance policy providing coverage against losses due to 
fraudulent entry by authorized users has a largely untapped market 
that could provide revenue for forward-thinking insurance 
companies. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The current law governing indemnification for computer 
systems fraud does not benefit the insured.  In Universal, the New 
York Court of Appeals found that a rider indemnifying the insured 
for losses from computer systems fraud covers only unauthorized use 
of the computer system and did not cover fraudulent use by an 
authorized user.221  Hence, the court in Universal precluded coverage 
for losses incurred by an authorized user.222 
This note’s analysis of the various criteria for both fraudulent 
use and unauthorized users demonstrates that courts have discretion 
to find that similar provisions for insurance fraud could cover the 
insured in future cases.  Additionally, the difficulty that health 
insurance companies face in seeking redress should cause the insured 
to carefully review the wording of their contracts; otherwise, they 
have no guarantee that they will be covered for this type of fraud. 
As illustrated by both Universal and Morgan Stanley, both the 
New York Court of Appeals and the Superior Court of New Jersey 
Appellate Division have precluded coverage for losses incurred by an 
authorized user of the insured’s computer system committing 
fraudulent acts.223  Health insurance companies seeking 
indemnification for these kinds of losses should seek additional 
advice as to whether their current Computer Systems Fraud rider 
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offers the coverage they seek, and in the case that it does not, they 
should seek additional coverage. 
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